The Ministry of Education requested the scientific opinion of Mr. Antonis Manitakis on the constitutionality of the private universities bill. However, the constitutional expert is also an executive of the University of Nicosia who aspires to establish a medical school precisely thanks to the provisions of the same bill. which are now a law of the state (Law No. 5094/2024 | Government Gazette Α’/13.3.2024). These facts raise, in the absence of an effective legislative framework, a conflict of interest issue.
Let’s take a closer look at Mr Manitakis. Since 2020, the eminent constitutional scholar has served as Chairman of the Scientific Council of the Faculty of Law of the (private and for-profit) University of Nicosia. This position is of particular importance, as the University of Nicosia is planning, in cooperation with the Hellenic Healthcare Group (a company owned by CVC Capital Partners, a fund that controls private hospitals such as Ygeia and Metropolitan), to create the first private School of Medicine in Greece. On 29 January 2024, the University of Nicosia and Hellenic Healthcare Group notified the Competition Commission of the joint venture. The notification was made several days before the Ministry of Education put the bill to consultation (8 February 2024).
However, despite this evident potential conflict of interest, the Ministry of Education, under the ministry of Kyriakos Pierrakakis, asked for the expert’s scientific opinion on the constitutionality of the bill, as Manitakis himself told Reporters United. He explained that, when public dialogue on private universities began, discussions were obviously held between constitutional experts and ministers, including himself. Specifying that he expressed his views based on previously published positions, and was unpaid, he also noted that in the context of drafting a bill, it is impossible for a ministry not to consult constitutional experts in order to examine its compatibility with the Constitution.α
In July 2023, Mr Manitakis published in the legal journal Constitutionalism an opinion piece in favour of the establishment of branches of foreign universities in Greece. The opinion was also published in the journal Human Rights. The text notes that Mr Manitakis, as well as being a constitutional expert scholar, was also head of the scientific committee of the Faculty of Law of the University of Nicosia.
The interesting thing is that, shortly afterwards, publications in government-friendly media (Proto Thema, Kathimerini, Parapolitika, Liberal) would talk about an agreement between CVC Capital Partners and the University of Nicosia (where Mr Manitakis works) to establish the first private medical school in Greece, even though the relevant legislative framework that would make such a venture possible did not exist. This raises a fundamental question: How could Hellenic Healthcare Group, CVC Capital Partners and the University of Nicosia be having discussions about a private school from mid-2023 whilst the legislative initiative that would make it possible was not public knowledge until six months later? Mr Manitakis has commented that in his capacity as head of the scientific committee of the University of Nicosia, he had two and a half years ago prepared a study on the issue of private universities, which he later communicated both publicly and to the government. Constitutional theory, he explained, has dealt with the issue of private universities, in the context of constitutional revisions.
Although Greek legislation provides for some limited measures to avoid conflicts of interest and revolving doors in government and high public office, it does not effectively cover all cases where such an issue arises.
Law no. 4622/2019 (Articles 68-76) and the Executive State mandate (Government Gazette Α’ 133 / 7.8.2019,) provides that for those persons appointed as members of the government and deputy ministers the exercise of any professional or business activity is automatically suspended. At the same time, it provides that members of the Government must obtain for one year after their departure a licence from the Ethics Committee of the National Transparency Authority for any professional activity related to the activity of the body to which they were appointed, where a conflict of interest may arise.
However, the relevant legislative framework is not considered sufficient. More specifically, the report of the Fifth Evaluation Cycle of the Council of Europe’s Group of States against Corruption (GRECO), analysing the above provisions, has made a number of recommendations to the Greek government regarding the conflict of interest rules, recommending that the legal status and obligations of political consultants (such as associates and special advisers to members of the government) should be clarified and precisely regulated to bring them under high standards of integrity, including the relevant ethical rules, conflicts of interest and financial disclosure obligations.
GRECO’s recommendation shows that the Council of Europe’s leading anti-corruption body has considered that a more comprehensive legislative framework is needed for political consultants who already have a dependent employment relationship (either public or private) with the state, which highlights the need to adopt transparency, ethics and conflict of interest measures for private individuals who, as in the case of Mr. Antonis Manitakis, provide (formally or informally) advisory services to the state, while at the same time have a paid employment relationship with a private (possibly also for-profit) body, the operation of which is influenced by the legislation for which the executive is providing advisory services to the government.
A state governed by the rule of law should provide for concrete measures that will bring transparency and effectively combat all revolving doors and conflicts of interest.
However, as the case of Mr. Antonis Manitakis shows, Greece has not adopted a legislative framework that would cover all such cases and, more specifically, provide rules and conditions on whether and how an executive of a private and for-profit organisation can provide advice to the government on a bill regulating the operation of the organisation with which he is linked through a dependent employment relationship.
The lack of such measures makes it easier for private entities to exert non-transparent influence and lobby in the exercise of public power and lawmaking.
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