Issue of Violation of Judicial Independence by the Supreme Court in the Context of a Criminal Case in Rhodes

The Supreme Court’s decision to initiate disciplinary proceedings against members of the judiciary who handled the Rhodes Urban Planning Department case has raised serious concerns about judicial independence, according to interventions from prosecutors, judges, and lawyers.

On 25 March 2025, the President of the Supreme Court, Ioanna Klapa, ordered disciplinary proceedings against the investigating magistrate and the public prosecutor of the Rhodes Court of First Instance, who had overseen the Urban Planning Department case.

According to Kathimerini, the inquiry was deemed urgent and will examine why the judicial authorities released suspects implicated in the Rhodes Urban Planning network, despite substantial evidence of involvement in a criminal organization and other offenses. The magistrate and prosecutor chose not to impose pre‑trial detention, instead releasing the suspects under restrictive conditions, judging there was no risk of flight, further offenses, or concealment of evidence.

This move by the Supreme Court has sparked widespread concern over judicial independence.

Prosecutors’ Association

On 26 March 2025, the Association of Prosecutors of Greece stressed that disciplinary action based on the substance of a judicial decision—and its wide publicity—undermines the constitutionally guaranteed independence of judges. Such measures, it warned, damage criminal justice and democracy, fueling disparaging narratives about judicial weakness.

The Association cited Articles 87–92 of the Constitution, which establish functional independence for prosecutors, reinforced by Article 23(3) of the Code on the Organization of Courts and Judicial Officials. This provision prohibits any directive to a judicial officer on substantive or procedural matters in specific cases. Article 28(4)(c) of the Code further affirms that prosecutors act independently, guided only by law and conscience.

It also invoked Article 109(4) of the Code, which clarifies that refusal to apply unconstitutional provisions, judicial judgments, public opinions (unless intended to undermine justice or promote partisan politics), and participation in judicial associations do not constitute disciplinary offenses.

Article 87 of the Constitution enshrines judicial independence, stating that justice is administered by regular judges who enjoy functional and personal independence, and that judges are bound only by the Constitution and the law. Article 109(1) of the Code defines disciplinary offenses as culpable acts or omissions that contravene constitutional obligations or undermine judicial authority.

Administrative Judges & International Standards

The Association of Administrative Judges highlighted that judicial decisions cannot be treated as disciplinary offenses, and warned that independence is violated when disciplinary proceedings are initiated alongside public criticism of judicial rulings.

The Universal Charter of the Judge(Article 7(1) reinforces this principle, stipulating that disciplinary prosecution must never endanger judicial independence and may only be based on objective grounds. Except in cases of intent or gross negligence established by final decision, judges cannot face disciplinary action for their interpretation of law, assessment of facts, or evaluation of evidence.

The European Association of Judges (EAJ) added that disciplinary procedures are inherently sensitive, prone to misuse, and risk undermining both judicial independence and the rule of law if not properly regulated.

Bar Associations

Greek Bar Associations also opposed the proceedings, arguing that repeated interventions by the Supreme Court’s leadership undermine both the judiciary’s authority and the rule of law. The order to discipline judicial officials in the Rhodes case was described as a step backward.

The Coordinating Committee of the Plenary of Presidents of Bar Associations emphasized that, rather than safeguarding independence, the Supreme Court’s leadership systematically pressures judges under the threat of disciplinary review. Without access to the case file and during the legally mandated secrecy of pre‑trial proceedings, the Court sought to scrutinize the judgment of the competent judge. They warned that this was not an isolated incident but part of a broader pattern of interference.

The Plenary further stressed that such interventions violate the principle of the lawful judge ((Article 8 of the Constitution and Article 6(1) ECHR), as well as the personal and functional independence of judges (Article 87 of the Constitution). The Rhodes Bar Association,echoed this, noting that while judges are subject to scrutiny, it must be conducted in line with constitutional and legal safeguards – not through interventions of this kind.

On 27 March, the Plenary of Presidents of Bar Associations convened to address repeated interventions by the Supreme Court. It resolved to request that the Minister of Justice investigate the disciplinary responsibility of the Court’s President under Law 4938/2022, and to inform EU institutions and the Council of Bars and Law Societies of Europe (CCBE) of the risks posed to European legal culture. On 7 April, the Plenary submitted a formal report to Justice Minister Giorgos Floridis.

Academic Commentary

In Nova Criminalia, Aristomenis Tzannetis, Secretary General of the Association of Greek Criminal Lawyers and Associate Professor at the University of Athens, argued that neither constitutional guarantees nor prohibitions on disciplinary review prevented the initiation and public disclosure of the proceedings. He warned that such inquiries erode judicial authority from within and reflect long‑standing dysfunction in the relationship between executive and judicial power.

In Documento, lawyer Theodoros Mantas, member of the Athens Bar Association board, similarly argued that repeated interventions by the Supreme Court undermine both judicial authority and the rule of law. He pointed to the Rhodes case as a clear example of regression.

Supreme Court’s Response

Following these reactions, the Supreme Court issued a new statement on 26 March 2025 defending its decision. It emphasized that freedom of opinion for judges and prosecutors is fundamental to independence, but must not be confused with immunity from oversight. Determining whether a judicial opinion exceeds the limits of discretion, it noted, lies solely with the judicial bodies designated by the Constitution and the Code, which act with full knowledge of the case file to safeguard the rule of law, justice, and public trust.

Concerns about interference with judicial independence had already surfaced in summer 2024, when the Court’s involvement in another criminal case was criticized as incompatible with constitutional guarantees.

Where is the problem with the rule of law?

In a state governed by the rule of law, judicial independence must not only be constitutionally and legislatively guaranteed but also respected by all branches of government – judicial, executive, and legislative alike. Yet, according to the legal analyses cited, the present case raises concerns of a violation of the principle of the judge’s free and independent judgment.

This is despite the explicit safeguards provided in Article 8 of the Constitution and Article 6(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights, Article 87(1) and (2) of the Constitution, Article 109(1) and (4) of the Code on the Organization of Courts and the Status of Judicial Officials, Article 7(1) of the Universal Charter of the Judge, as well as Articles 88(4) and 91(3) of the Constitution.

Thodoris Chondrogiannos